葡京真人
会议预告|微观经济学工作坊系列之五(20211019)

2021-10-15

调整字号:

 

报告题目:N-Player War of Attrition with Complete Information

主讲:  汪浩   

主持:  杜创

时间:  20211019日星期二14:30--16:00

地点:  北京市西城区月坛北小街22号楼22201会议室

 

备注:欢迎参会,无需提前报名。

 

报告摘要:

This paper considers a non-degenerate war of attrition in which heterogeneous player compete for prizes. The equilibrium mixed strategies feature exponential distributions. Except that with N=2, such an equilibrium may not exist because a weak player may not be able to fight a real war of attrition. But as long as the equilibrium exists, the weaker players play the game more patiently than the others, and therefore are more likely to win. All players, including the strong ones, obtain zero expected payoffs. Under mild condition, the non-degenerate mixed strategy equilibrium is unique when it exists. When k>1, i.e., more than one players must concede before the game ends, k-1 of the players concedes at the very beginning of the game. The model can be extended to the cases when the winners’ payoffs depend on which players concede, and that when the players face the risks of “defeat.”

 

主讲人简介:

汪浩,北京大学国家发展研究院教授

研究方向:产业组织理论

(编辑:刘益建;审校:张佶烨)